Suing Satan and “The Devil Made Me Do It” Defense

“God told me to do it”

In some cases of religious civil disobedience or religious illegal activity the perpetrators claim they should not be held accountable because they were acting on behalf of God.  

“The devil made me do it”

Sometimes, perpetrators of illegal conduct claim they should not be held liable because they were influenced or possessed by the devil. “The devil made me do it.” 

In such cases the courts side-step the religious claims of demonic possession and focus on the secular concepts of insanity.

Demon told mother to poison her son

In State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850 (1992), a mother was convicted of first-degree murder for poisoning her son. Winn admitted poisoning her son, but claimed she was told to do so by a demon. 

Winn’s pastor testified that during counseling sessions her facial expressions, demeanor, personality, and voice changed. Her voice became deep and gruff. She would slumped into semi-consciousness, wake up, and cry. The pastor believed the mother was exhibiting different personalities. In the pastor’s opinion, the mother was acting like a person possessed by the devil. 

The prosecution moved to strike the pastor’s testimony.  The court agreed.

The trial court concluded that the pastor’s opinion regarding demonic possession was not relevant because the law did not recognize that defense. Moreover, the pastor was not qualified as an expert on such matters. On appeal, the mother’s conviction was affirmed.

Father killed daughter because she was the devil

In People v. Wade, 44 Cal.3d 975 (1988), Wade was convicted of the murder of his daughter. Prior to the murder the Wade claimed he was “Michael the Archangel” and must kill the girl because she was the devil.

Several psychiatrists testified that Wade was suffering from multiple personality disorder. One personality was “Othello,” the “Son of Satan” who fed on “germs of loneliness and despair.” Another personality was “Joe,” a “devil in training,” waiting for another body to possess. One personality was “Michael the Archangel,” the arch enemy of “Othello.” 

The psychiatrists concluded that Wade was unable to form the intent to kill.  One psychiatrist concluded that Wade suffered from “possession syndrome,” an atypical mental disorder which occurs when the person believes he is possessed by demons. 

The jury rejected Wade’s multiple-personality-demon-possession-insanity defense, and found him guilty.

Demon-possessed detective coerced involuntary confession

People v. Kashney, 590 N.E.2d 688 (Ill. 1986), provides an interesting variation on the demonic possession theme. 

Kashney argued that his murder confession should be thrown out because he believed the investigating officer was possessed by demons. This belief caused Kashney to fear for his life, rendering the confession coerced and involuntary.

Kashney called two “demonologists” as witnesses. One of demonologists testified to the existence of demons. The second demonologist testified that it was possible for a person to believe that another person is possessed by demons, and under such a belief, to respond with extreme fear. 

The judge and jury did not buy the demon defense, and Kashney was convicted.

Husband killed his wife and baby to drive out their demons

In People v. Stack, 470 N.E.2d 1252 (Ill.App. 1984), Stack was accused of murdering his wife and baby. A police detective testified that when police arrived to arrest Stack he was screaming about devils and demons. 

Stack told detectives that he had attended mass twice the day of the murder.  Following the second mass he began fighting demons who were coming from his wife and baby.  The demons were coming from his wife because she had not gone to confession. When he attacked his wife, he was trying to rid the world of evil and drive the demons out. 

A hospital doctor testified that Stack spoke in a low rough demonic voice and claimed that his left hand belonged to someone else.

Two priests testified that the defendant was not in touch with reality and needed professional help. 

One psychiatrist testified that Stack exhibited delusions concerning possessing special powers, being persecuted by non-Catholics, and having visual hallucinations. 

A second psychiatrist testified that Stack believed his baby looked like the baby Jesus, a sure sign that the wife and baby were possessed by demons. 

Stack was convicted by the jury. 

Man sues Satan in federal court for causing his downfall. Judge responds tongue-in-cheek.

A very unique and interesting civil case is Mayo v. Satan and his Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971). Mayo filed a lawsuit against Satan and his staff because they tormented him and placed obstacles in his path that lead to Mayo’s downfall.

Because of his downfall, Mayo claimed he was too poor to pay the court filing fee.  He filed a petition to be exempt. The court denied the petition in writing. 

The judge, explained, tongue in cheek, that Mayo failed to personally serve Satan with the summons. The judge also speculated that since Satan tormented so many people, the case should be filed as a class action.  Furthermore, Mayo failed to give the U.S. Marshal detailed instructions on how the serve Satan. The judge wrote:

 “We question whether plaintiff may obtain personal jurisdiction over the Satan in this judicial district. The complaint contains no allegation of Satan’s residence in this district. 

“While the official reports disclose no case where Satan has appeared in court as defendant, there was an unofficial account of a trial in New Hampshire where Satan filed an action of mortgage foreclosure [on a soul] as plaintiff.

 “Satan in that action was represented by the preeminent advocate of that day, who raised the defense that Satan was a foreign prince with no standing to sue in an American court.  This defense was overcome by overwhelming evidence to the contrary. [Famous Tale of “The Devil and Daniel Webster.”] 

“If such action were to be allowed we would also face the question of whether it may be maintained as a class action.  It appears to meet the requirements that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, there are questions of law and fact common to the class, and the claims of the representative party is typical of the claims of the class.  We cannot now determine if the representative party will fairly protect the interests of the class.

“We note that the plaintiff has failed to include with his complaint the required form of instructions for the United States Marshal for directions as to service of process.”

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